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Abstract: The coastal zone of Louisiana contains more than 3 million wetland acres and has the highest
acreage of salt marsh of any state. However, Louisiana accounts for 80 percent of the nation’s coastal
land loss. The loss of Louisiana’s coastal wetlands results in changes in economic and ecological
benefits on local communities. The purpose of the study is to investigate the factors that motivate
private coastal landowners to participate in income-generating activities and the level of income
derived from their coastal wetland parcels and to gauge their opinion of potential policy instruments
for coastal wetlands stewardship. A double-hurdle model was applied to econometrically identify
the determinants on the participation and level of participation in income-generating activities
using data collected from a sample of coastal wetland owners. The results based on the estimated
parameters and marginal effects revealed that decisions to participate and the level of participation are
related to physical characteristics of the wetland and socioeconomic characteristics of the landowner.
For example, the type of wetland is the primary factor influencing the decision to participate and the
level of participation. In addition, understanding the landowner’s attitude toward wetland restoration
program provides the opportunity for policymakers to better evaluate current and potential policies
for coastal management in Louisiana.
Keywords: coastal management; double-hurdle model; income-generating activity; marginal effect;
wetland

1. Introduction
1.1. Coastal Wetland Loss in Louisiana
Louisiana’s coastal wetlands provide a variety of economic, ecological, cultural, and recreational
values and are some of the most productive ecosystems in the United States. Benefits of coastal
wetlands include flood control, shoreline protection, carbon storage, provision of biological diversity,
and support for many fishery and ecotourism industries [1]. The Louisiana Coastal Zone (LCZ)
includes more than 3 million wetland acres. While this area is vast, the state has experienced a net
loss of over 1900 square miles (1,216,000 acres) of coastal wetlands since the 1930s. Barras et al. [2]
estimated a current annual average land loss rate of 24 square miles (15,360 acres) per year. The total
land loss at this rate in Louisiana represents approximately 80% of the coastal wetland loss occurring
in the continental United States. Several factors have contributed to this loss, including hydrologic
modification, navigation canals, nutrient and sediment starvation, sea level rise, and subsidence [3–5].
Currently at risk are the remaining coastal wetlands, most of which are under private ownership.
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At the present rate and without substantial increases in restoration spending, another 600–1000 square
miles are expected to be lost by the year 2050.
1.2. Traditional Program Approaches
More than 2 billion in state and federal dollars have already been directed toward this crisis,
with an additional 50 billion called for by an ambitious, 50-year state master plan [5]. These investments
are predicated on the need for protection and restoration of a wide range of market and non-market
benefits, including: storm surge attenuation, protection of coastal communities and commercial
infrastructure, maintenance of water quality and quantity, and the provision of critical habitat for
numerous species of birds, fish, wildlife, and plants. To date, the vast majority of this spending has come
through large-scale hydrologic, vegetative, and structural projects funded via federal–state partnerships.
This public-works approach to restoration has been the hallmark of major project sponsors for the past
three decades, including the Coastal Wetland Planning, Protection, and Restoration Act (CWPPRA),
the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA), and the Coastal Impact Assistance Program (CIAP).
Other federal laws and programs, however, have acknowledged the potential for smaller-scale projects
and landowner incentives in maximizing the return on limited program dollars. The livelihoods of
coastal landowners are often closely linked to the sustainability and productivity of their property.
Thus, restoration programming that capitalizes on the economic incentives of private landowners could
help to maximize the return on limited funding. Such approaches are common in the programmatic
approaches utilized in the Conservation Title of the US Farm Bill. Caffey et al. [6] pointed to the
apparent advantage of this landowner-based model, noting that conservation programs had contracted
600% more wetland acreage in Louisiana than the acreage benefited by CWPPRA projects, and had
done so at 40% of the cost.
1.3. Existing and Potential Policy Instruments in Louisiana
Not all policy options are equally effective in achieving desired social goals given the alternative
enterprises and the influence of different property characteristics and socioeconomic characteristics
on the income-generating potential of coastal property. As differentiation in a landowners’ resources,
opportunities, and attitudes increases, the complexity of the response to a given policy will also
increase. This may require that policy instruments be tailored to specific landowner and property
characteristics. In practice, the effectiveness of public goals to encourage private coastal restoration
efforts may depend upon more than just a simple method of making transfer payments. The reason for
this is that private landowners with different situations are likely to exhibit heterogeneous preferences
over a range of relevant land use alternatives. A wide range of management approaches has been
proposed for the general problems of land and water conservation and ecosystem restoration in the
United States. General categories of these approaches, with some specific examples relevant to coastal
Louisiana, include:
•

•

•

Public land purchases—Federal programs such as the CWPPRA and the Land and Water
Conservation Fund (LWCF) have enabled the purchase and restoration of a small percentage of
the coastal wetlands in Louisiana. Many private landowners, however, may be reluctant to sell
their properties, preferring other means of achieving restoration goals.
Public purchase of permanent or temporary conservation easements—Federal programs located
in the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce provide small levels of funding for the
purchase of conservation easements on private coastal wetland properties.
Establishing new markets for land—One existing but underutilized approach is the establishment
of wetland mitigation banks through which credits for wetland restoration can be bought and
sold. Another potential approach is the establishment of a market for carbon credits; brackish
marshes such as those in the Louisiana coastal zone are believed to have good potential for
carbon sequestration.
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Implementing innovative tax incentive programs—One potential incentive scheme involves
severing, where needed, surface and subsurface property rights so that oil and gas producers
may continue to exploit subsurface minerals but also may take advantage of reduced taxes for
undertaking surface restoration efforts. The second example in this category would be shifting
towards the taxing of land activities and not property. This latter approach is a landowner-specific
approach that could be developed and refined using the results of this research.
Subsidies for plant, fish, and wildlife management—Examples include bounties on the eradication
of nuisance species, such as nutria (Myocastor coypus), an herbivorous rodent whose behavior is
extremely destructive of wetlands. Another example includes programs to compensate landowners
for conserving protected species, such as the US Fish and Wildlife Service’s Private Stewardship
Grants Program.

Specific programs for stewardship of privately-owned wetlands in the LCZ have primarily taken
the form of easements and incentives. In the 1970s and 1980s, many landowners participated in the
Water Bank Program (WBP), which provided $30 million annually for wetland preservation easements.
In the past 20 years, wetland stewardship funding has been primarily available to coastal landowners
through programs administered through the Conservation Title of the U.S. Farm Bill. Such programs
are administered by the Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) and have included the
Coastal Wetlands Reserve Program (CWRP), the Wetland Reserve Easement (WRE), and coastal
habitat subsidies provided under the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). Additionally,
landowners in the LCZ interested in waterfowl habitat improvement projects have had access to U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) funding under the North American Wetlands Conservation Act
(NAWCA). The NAWCA was established in 1989 to provide small grants and cost-share partnerships
for wetlands conservation projects. Finally, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) administers a Coastal and Estuarine Land Conservation Program (CELCP). This acquisition
program has provided state and local governments with funding to protect more than 100,000 acres of
threatened coastal estuarine lands.
1.4. Tapping into Private Incentives
The literature examining participation in federal/state wetland-restoration sponsored programs
is limited; however, several studies have looked specifically at conservation program participation
at the individual level in the United States as well as in other countries [7–13]. Aside from literature
focused on wetlands, a number of studies have been conducted examining those factors leading to
participation in various land conservation programs [10,14–25]. In general, previous studies indicate
that a landowners’ decision to participate in land-related activities (such as ecosystem conservation
and wetland restoration) is affected by a wide range of economic, geographic, and sociological
factors [9,11,13,26,27]. While the technology necessary for wetland conservation and restoration varies
in complexity and cost, in many cases these solutions will either impact or be implemented on private
lands. This situation is especially true in Louisiana, where more than 80% of coastal wetlands are
privately owned [5].
Incentivizing environmental stewardship of privately-held tracts requires an understanding
of the economic linkages between landowners and natural resources. Roberts et al. [28] described
a partitioning of Louisiana’s coastal wetland revenues into ‘surface’ and ‘subsurface’ categories.
Subsurface revenues are those emanating from the production of oil and natural gas-based energy.
Energy revenues have historically accounted for the majority of income to private coastal landowners
in the state—although these sources have been on a long-term decline due to resource depletion,
falling prices, and the offshore migration of the petroleum sector. The authors describe surface-based
revenues for various wetland types (freshwater, brackish, and salt) and indicate that two types of
enterprises—waterfowl hunting and alligator harvesting (egg and adult) comprise the vast majority of
surface-based revenues. While other wetland-based commercial activities have emerged in recent years
(e.g., ecotourism, fishing leases), the majority of surface revenues from Louisiana’s coastal wetlands
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continue to be dominated by waterfowl- and alligator-based enterprises. According to 2017 Louisiana
Summary [29], total Louisiana gross farm value of all alligator harvest (wild and farm-raised) and
waterfowl hunting leases during 2017 were $83.6 million and $55.21 million, respectively. The total
gross farm value of all alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting from the 20 coastal parishes during
2017 accounted for 64 percent and 68 percent of the state total for these two enterprises, respectively.
These surface values are driven to a great extent by habitat quality and the extent to which
landowners maintain or enhance that habitat through investments in environmental stewardship.
Dedah [7] found, however, that almost three-quarters of coastal wetland owners in Louisiana exhibited
risk-averse behavior regarding wetland stewardship expenditures, likely due to the relatively low
income derived from surface-use activities versus subsurface revenues from oil and natural gas.
The author suggests that landowners would be reluctant to support publicly funded wetland
conservation and restoration projects simply on the prospect that such projects would provide
substantial public benefits. If the private benefits to landowners for preserving their wetlands were
higher, however, there might be greater incentive to participate in stewardship programming.
1.5. Approach and Rationale
The goal of this study is to employ an empirical model to examine the factors that motivate
landowner participation and intensity of surface-based income generating activities and to gauge
their opinion of potential policy instruments for coastal wetlands stewardship. Specific objectives
include: (a) Determining landowner characteristics, including attitudes and use of their wetland
property for surface income-generating activities, knowledge and opinions regarding cost-sharing
programs, and their general socioeconomic information; (b) Identifying physical characteristics of the
associated property parcels, including the type of wetland, the total acreage of different marsh types,
and presence of a hunting lodge/camp, etc.; (c) Estimating the importance of specific property and
landowner characteristics on participation rates and the intensity of participation (i.e., the level of
income-generating activities) in the two primary enterprises conducted on coastal Louisiana wetland
properties (i.e., alligator and waterfowl hunting enterprises); and, (d) Exploring the general constraints
and opportunities for participation in wetland stewardship programs based on the findings above.
The remainder of this paper is presented in four parts. The methods section outlines the
case study and sample frame, the econometric approach, and model variables. The results section
includes a discussion of maximum likelihood estimates, marginal effects, and program participation.
The conclusion section summarizes the findings. The last section discusses limitations and additional
research and implications for public policy.
2. Methods
2.1. Case Study and Sample
The study area is located in the Louisiana Coastal Zone (LCZ); the State of Louisiana is divided into
64 parishes, of which 20 parishes are located in Louisiana’s tidally-influenced coastal zone. This region
contains a range of wetland habitats, ranging from freshwater to saline marsh. Figure 1 shows the
water/wetland interface for five coastal parishes (Cameron, Lafourche, Plaquemines, Terrebonne,
and Vermilion parishes), which were chosen in this study (Figure 1). The total gross farm value of
all wild alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting from these parishes in 2017 was $64.66 million and
$35.27 million, which account for 75 percent and 64 percent of the state total and account for 99 percent
and 94 percent of the 20 coastal parishes total for these two enterprises, respectively [29]. For this
study, a questionnaire was implemented using Dillman’s [30] tailored design method for mail surveys.
This survey was designed to determine how the characteristics of individual landowners and their
properties influence their participation and intensity in revenue-generating activities. Additional
questions were used to gauge participation in wetland restoration programming, and respondent
perceptions of opportunities and constraints by program type. A draft version of the questionnaire
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The mailing list of private coastal landowners was obtained from coastal parish assessor’s
offices. Following Dedah [7], this study initially stratified landowners of 1159 parcels into three
was developed in early 2015 and tested amongst extension agents of the Louisiana Sea Grant College
groups based on the number of wetland parcels owned. Landowners having ownership of three or
program. The survey instrument contained two sections with a total of 23 questions that allowed
more parcels were excluded from the study given the large scale of land under management, the
for quick answers selected from several categories. The last question was open-ended and solicited
complexity and divergent management objectives across multiple tracts, and difficulties in
additional topics that might not have been adequately covered in this survey. The final version of the
identifying the correct spokesperson within larger, corporately-owned operations. This refined the
questionnaire is provided in Appendix A.
research focus to landowners having only one or two parcels.

Figure 1. Study area: Parishes of coastal Louisiana in which landowners were surveyed (Source:
U.S.
Geological
Figure
1. Study Survey).
area: Parishes of coastal Louisiana in which landowners were surveyed (Source: U.S.

Geological Survey).
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self-addressed postage-paid return envelope. Approximately two weeks later, a postcard was sent out
reminding
landowners
to fill out the survey if they had not already done so. The final number of useful
2.2. Econometric
Approach
returns from this process was 122, or an effective response rate of 14%. These respondents owned a
Conventionally, three main econometric methodologies, the standard Tobit model, the Heckit
total of 99,425 acres with an average holding of 814 acres. In terms of the total wetland area controlled
model, and double-hurdle model, could be utilized to investigate landowners’ decisions concerning
by the survey respondents, these individuals controlled approximately 3% of the total wetland acreage
participation in income-generating activities and the level of income derived from these activities.
in the LCZ [5].
The Tobit model, however, is very restrictive in its parameterization and considers only the
dependent
variable
to be censored at the corner and ignores the source of zero observations [31–34].
2.2.
Econometric
Approach
Although the Heckit model uses a two-stage estimation procedure to deal with the problem
Conventionally, three main econometric methodologies, the standard Tobit model, the Heckit
associated with the zero observations generated by the non-participation decision, it assumes no zero
model, and double-hurdle model, could be utilized to investigate landowners’ decisions concerning
observation in the second stage [21]. The double-hurdle model generalizes the Tobit model by
participation in income-generating activities and the level of income derived from these activities.
introducing an additional hurdle which must be passed before observing any positive values and
The Tobit model, however, is very restrictive in its parameterization and considers only the dependent
permits potential zero values in the second stage [35]. By using a Probit estimator to model the
participation decision, zero observations on the dependent variable can be either attributed to corner
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variable to be censored at the corner and ignores the source of zero observations [31–34]. Although the
Heckit model uses a two-stage estimation procedure to deal with the problem associated with the zero
observations generated by the non-participation decision, it assumes no zero observation in the second
stage [21]. The double-hurdle model generalizes the Tobit model by introducing an additional hurdle
which must be passed before observing any positive values and permits potential zero values in the
second stage [35]. By using a Probit estimator to model the participation decision, zero observations
on the dependent variable can be either attributed to corner solutions or nonparticipation [31,35].
This model also allows the two stages to be treated separately. Thus, a separate stochastic process can
be used to model the probability of participation and the level of participation [36].
In this study, private landowners’ decisions can be divided into a two-stage decision-making
process. In the first stage, the wetland owner must decide whether to participate in income-generating
activities. It is expected to reflect the individual’s perceptions and attitudes toward those factors
influencing income-generating activities. Conditional on the outcome of the first stage, the second
stage considers the level of income to be forthcoming from these activities. The decision process
suggests that the double-hurdle model is appropriate for the current study.
Double-Hurdle Model
Following Jones [24], the specification of the DH model can be expressed as
Stage 1: Participation decision equation
y∗1i = x1i β1 + 1i ; 1i ∼ N (0, 1)
(
y1i =

1 i f y∗1i > 0
0 otherwise

(1)
(2)

Stage 2: Level of income equation


y∗2i = x2i β2 + 2i ; 2i ∼ N 0, σ2

(3)

y∗2i i f y1i = 1 and y∗2i > 0
0 i f y1i = 0

(4)

(
y2i =

Finally, the observed level of income is determined as
yi = y1i ·y2i = x2i β2 + 2i i f y∗1i > 0 and y∗2i > 0

(5)

In this specification, a positive level of income yi is observed if y∗1i > 0 and y∗2i > 0. This illustrates
the DH element to the model. y∗1i is a latent endogenous variable representing the decision to participate
in income-generating activities for landowner i, y∗2i is a latent variable representing the level of income
for landowner i, yi is the observed level of income for a landowner i. x1i is a set of landowner
characteristics and beliefs that influence the landowner’s decision to participate in income-generating
activities, x2i is a vector of physical characteristics of the property (e.g., total acres and percent in
different wetland types and open water) that affect the landowner’s level of income. β1 and β2 are
vectors of estimable parameter. In this formulation, (x1i ; x2i ) may contain the same common explanatory
variables, although their corresponding effects on the two hurdle equations might be quite different.
1i is normalized to 1 since the outcome of the first hurdle is binary. Both error terms, 1i and 2i ,
are assumed to be normal and independently distributed and can be written as
1i
2i

!

"
∼N

!
0
,
0

1
0

0
σ2

!#
(6)

The independent DH model is estimated using maximum likelihood technique and the log
likelihood function is given as
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X
0

"
!# X "
!#
x2i β2
yi − x2i β2
1
ln 1 − Φ(x1i β1 )Φ
ln Φ(x1i β1 ) ∅
+
σ
σ
σ
+

(7)

where ‘0’ under the summation sign denotes the summation over the zero observations in the sample
(level of income yi β1 β1 is zero) and ‘+’ indicates summation over the positive observations (level
of income yi β1 β1 is positive); Φ(·)Φx1i β1 and ∅(·) demote standard normal cumulative distribution
function and standard normal probability density function (cdf and pdf ), respectively.
The parameter estimates of the DH model, however, provide little direct information and the
economic interpretation frequently focuses on the analysis of the marginal effects of regressors on
the expected value of yi for limited dependent variable models [37]. By using the McDonald and
Moffitt [38] decomposition, the unconditional expected value of the DH model can be expressed as [37]


E( yi ) = P( yi > 0) ∗ E yi yi > 0

(8)



where P( yi > 0) is the probability of participation and E yi yi > 0 is the conditional expected level of
income. Following Burke’s [31] notation, the probability of participation is given as
P( yi > 0/x1i ) = 1 − P( yi = 0/x1i ) = Φ(x1i β1 )

(9)

The expected value of y, conditional on y > 0 is given as
x2i β2
E( yi /x2i , yi > 0) = x2i β2 + σλ
σ

!
(10)

∅(·)

where λ(·) is the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) λ(·) = Φ(·) . After substituting Equations (9) and (10) into
Equation (8), the unconditional expected value of y can be expressed as
!)
(
x2i β2
E( yi /x1i , x2i ) = Φ(x1i β1 ) x2i β2 + σλ
σ

(11)

Marginal effects can be obtained by taking the first derivative of Equations (9)–(11) with respect to the
explanatory variable x j . For continuous explanatory variables, the marginal effects are calculated at
the sample mean. While the marginal effects are used to measure percentage changes in the probability
of participation and the absolute changes in the conditional and unconditional level of income when
the value of variable shifts from zero to one [37].
2.3. Variables
In the econometrical model, the response variable of participation in income-generating activities
in the first stage represents a binary variable equal to 1 if the landowner i reports that he/she
participated in income-generating activities (i.e., alligator and/or waterfowl hunting) in 2015 and 0
otherwise. From the full sample, about 41% of landowners participated in these income-generating
activities. The variable of level of income from income-generating activates denotes the income
derived from alligator and/or waterfowl hunting in the second stage, which is represented by a
continuous variable equal to annual income in dollars for landowner i. The average income among
landowners who participated in these income-generating activities equaled $12,204 with a standard
deviation of $13,657 (Table 1). The respondent variables are assumed to be expressible as a linear
combination of a vector of explanatory variables. Previous researchers have provided insight on
landowners’ and other stakeholders’ perceptions towards decisions on whether to participate in a
given conservation program and have found that a suite of socioeconomic and property characteristic
factors are important [10–13,26–28]. The various studies give an overall picture of the factors associated
with landowners’ participation.
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Table 1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics.
Variable

Description

Mean

Std.Dev

Response Variables
Participation in income-generating activities
Level of income from income-generating activities
Explanatory Variables
Socio-economic Characteristics
Aged 54 or younger
College degree
Land ownership
Years of ownership
Participating in government program
Participating in other commercial-based activities
An active outdoor enthusiast

=1 if landowners participated in leasing land for
alligator/waterfowl hunting and 0 otherwise
income received from these activities ($/year)

=1 if a landowner was 54 years old or younger and 0
otherwise
=1 if a landowner had a college degree or higher and 0
otherwise
=1 if the landowner is a sole owner and 0 otherwise
the number of years that the property in question was
in family possession.
=1 if the landowner participated in any state or federal
wetland restoration program and 0 otherwise.
=1 if the landowner participated in any other
commercial-based activities and 0 otherwise
=1 if the landowner considers himself/herself to be an
outdoor enthusiast and 0 otherwise

0.41

0.49

12,204

13,657

0.15

0.36

0.72

0.45

0.31

0.47

70.87

38.73

0.10

0.30

0.14

0.35

0.65

0.48

0.66

0.48

0.11

0.32

0.13

0.34

0.75

0.43

0.18

0.39

Property Characteristics
Southeast parish

Hunting lodge/camp
Active management

=1 if the wetland parcels located in the southeast
coastal parishes (i.e., Terrebonne, Lafourche, and
Plaquemines) and 0 for those in the Southwest (i.e.,
Cameron and Vermilion)
=1 if hunting lodge/camp is available on the parcel and
0 otherwise
=1 if the landowner actively managed his/her wetland
property for waterfowl habitat and 0 otherwise

Land type
One land type

Two land type

Three land type
Total acreage of freshwater marsh
Total acreage of brackish marsh
Total acreage of salt marsh
Total acreage of other type of land

=1 if the property containing only one land type (i.e.,
freshwater marsh, brackish marsh, salt marsh, or
‘other’ land type) and 0 otherwise
=1 if the property with two types of land combination
(i.e., property comprised of freshwater marsh and
brackish marsh or property comprised of salt marsh
and brackish marsh) and 0 otherwise
=1 if the property containing three types of land and 0
otherwise
total acreage of freshwater marsh on the parcel
total acreage of brackish marsh on the parcel
total acreage of salt marsh on the parcel
the total non-wetland acres on the parcel

0.07

0.35

734
510
62
341

1409
1344
205
1167

From the survey, landowners were asked if they participate in any state or federal wetland
restoration program on the property specified in the questionnaire, e.g., CWPPRA, WBP, Wetlands
Reserve Program (WRP), and Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA). While enrollment
in a government program is hypothesized to impact the decision to participate in income-generating
activities, the expected relationship is unknown. According to responding landowners, other
commercial-based activities include farming, shrimping, crabbing, grazing, pasture, cattle production,
and commercial/industrial land rental for the non-wetland portion of the parcel.
Enrollment in other commercial-based activities is hypothesized to influence the decision to
participate in income-generating activities, and the expected relationship is unknown. While a variable
of outdoor enthusiast was not included in any of the studies reviewed in this study, one might
hypothesize that there is a relationship between participation/income and whether the landowner
considers himself to be an outdoor enthusiast. Based on landowner’s responses, their favorite outdoor
activities include fishing, hunting, hiking, biking, walking, and gardening. The wetlands located in
southwest Louisiana are generally higher quality. To investigate the spatial heterogeneity, the parish
location variable was included in this study. The presence of a hunting lodge/camp was hypothesized
to relate to the probability of participation and level of income from the participation. Active
management involves water control, vegetation management through burning, cutting, herbicides,
etc. on the property. It was hypothesized that active management would impact the decision of
participation in income-generating activities and the level of income from participation. Based on
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theoretical consideration and literature review, the explanatory variables in this study were categorized
by various socio-economic characteristics of the landowner and physical characteristics associated with the
individual properties. The explanatory variables selected, together with the sample descriptive statistics,
are presented and fully described in Table 1. The socio-economic characteristics of Landowner included
both socioeconomic and demographic variables as well as variables representing opinions held by the
respective landowners. Specifically, socio-economic characteristics variables include aged 54 or younger,
college degree, land ownership, years of ownership, participating in government program, participating in
other commercial-based activities, and an active outdoor enthusiast. The property characteristics variables
include southeast parish, hunting lodge/camp, active management, land type, total acreage of freshwater
marsh, total acreage of brackish marsh, total acreage of salt marsh, and total acreage of ‘other’ land.
3. Results
3.1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates
The maximum-likelihood (ML) estimates of the double-hurdle model are presented in Table 2
with associated robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The parameter estimates of the double
hurdle model provided direct information and indicated the significance of the explanatory variable
and the direction of its influence on the dependent variable.
Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimation of the DH model.
Participation Decision

Level of Income

1.90 ***
(0.69)
0.16
(0.44)
−0.72
(0.55)

−11,116.43
(11,273.45)
39,682.90 ***
(13,434.68)
−47,152.33 ***
(17,517.98)
−253.39 *
(135.19)
−12,153.41
(11,946.38)

Socioeconomic/Demographic Characteristics
Aged 54 or younger
College degree
Land ownership
Years of ownership

_

Participating in government program

_

Participating in other commercial-based activities
An active outdoor enthusiast

−5.48 ***
(0.87)
−0.76
(0.51)

_
_

Property Characteristics
Southeast parish
Hunting lodge/camp
Active management
One land type
Two land type
Three land type
Total acreage of fresh water marsh
Total acreage of brackish marsh
Total acreage of salt marsh
Total acreage of other type of land
Constant
Sigma
Wald x2 statistic
Log-Likelihood
Number of observations

0.34
(0.52)
−1.91 ***
(0.62)
10.15 ***
(1.11)
1.93 **
(0.99)
0.32
(0.87)
Reference group
0.0046 ***
(0.0015)
0.0011 ***
(0.0002)
−0.0009
(0.0010)
0.0003
(0.0002)
−3.38 ***
(0.99)
9260.94 ***
(2007.28)
1083.74 ***
−342.19
122

−7344.74
(8531.55)
13,738.71
(10,933.94)
1059.18
(18,018.51)
6649.30
(11,481.36)
18,771.96
(13,105.26)
Reference group
11.85 **
(5.45)
5.82 *
(3.46)
2.75
(17.11)
13.65 ***
(4.74)
−24,962.73
(22,400.95)

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05 and * = 0.10.
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The coefficients of aged 54 or younger and hunting lodge/camp on participation and level of
income exhibited different signs. The results suggest that landowners who are 54 years old or younger
were more likely to participate in income-generating activities. Landowners who had a hunting
lodge/camp on his/her wetland parcel were less likely to participate in income-generating activities but
received more income than other landowners if they did. The results supported the assumption of
the double-hurdle model that a factor might have different effects on the probability of participation
and the level of participation. Meanwhile, the variables, active management and one land type, were
found to positively related to the participation decision but was not significantly associated with the
level of participation. The opposite is true for the variables college degree, land ownership, years of
ownership, and total acreage of other type of land; these variables were found to be significant in the
level of participation but did not significantly associated with the participation decision. In addition,
the variables, total acreage of freshwater marsh and total acreage of brackish marsh were found to
be significant in both the participation equation and the level of income equation. Specifically, with
an increase in acreage of freshwater/brackish marsh, the empirical results showed an increase in
participation rate as well as the level of participation.
3.2. Marginal Effects Estimates
Table 3 presented the marginal effects (ME) of probability of participation, conditional, and
unconditional level of participation with corresponding standard errors, which are evaluated at the
sample mean of all variables. The discussion focuses specifically on the most interesting variables and
their interpretation.
The marginal effects with respect to land ownership had a significant and negative effect on the
level of income but not on the probability. The results indicated that sole-owners were found to receive
$11,830 and $6150 less income than landowners who own the wetland parcel through joint ownership
or ‘other’ ownership structure for the conditional and unconditional level of income, respectively.
One might hypothesize that the negative effect of sole ownership on income reflects time constraints
among sole owners. Specifically, leasing of property for waterfowl and/or alligator hunting may
require monitoring and other activities to ensure that lessees are abiding by the agreed upon rules of
use. Time constraints for a sole owner may exceed those in a ‘partnership’ where the various owners
can ‘split’ monitoring and other activities.
Concerning participating in government programs, the result indicated that whether to participate
in government-sponsored wetland restoration programs plays a negative and significant role in the level
of participation. This finding may reflect commercial restrictions placed on acreage upon enrollment
in government programs. This is the case, for example, with acreage enrolled in easement-based
programs such as the Wetlands Reserve Program and Conservation Reserve Program. The marginal
effect with respect to participating in other commercial-based activities indicated that landowners
who participated in other commercial-based activities have a 55% lower probability of participating in
income-generating activities from alligator and waterfowl uses.
The location variable (southeast parish) plays a negative and significant role on the conditional
level of income but not on the probability of participation and unconditional level of income derived
from participation. In particular, the conditional marginal effect indicated that landowners who own
wetland parcel in the southeast of Louisiana were found to receive $1842 less income. The results
suggest that location was an important factor associated with the level of income but did not impact
the decision of whether or not to participate in income-generating activities. The ‘poorer’ quality
associated with wetlands in the Southeast vis-à-vis Southwest may explain this finding. Since the
quality of the wetlands in southwest parishes are generally recognized to be of higher quality and this
quality is not considered in the analysis, one can expect that income generated from this participation
is higher in the southwest parishes than in the southeast parishes.
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Table 3. Marginal effects with respect to continuous and discrete variables.
Participation

Conditional Income

Unconditional Income

0.20
(0.26)
0.02
(0.17)
−0.07
(0.21)

−2789.06 **
(1338.70)
9955.55 ***
(2071.69)
−11,829.46 ***
(2829.42)
−63.57 ***
(17.88)
−3049.02 **
(1339.61)

−453.75
(1034.56)
4972.20 ***
(1002.94)
−6149.73 ***
(1523.96)
−31.29 ***
(6.70)
−1500.69 ***
(502.35)
−2507.17
(2683.96)
−349.24
(723.34)

−1842.63 **
(915.68)
3446.73 ***
(1044.77)
265.72
(1844.72)
1668.16
(1206.63)
4709.46 ***
(1548.57)
2.97 ***
(0.80)
1.46 ***
(0.47)
0.69
(1.73)
3.42 ***
(0.75)

−751.50
(710.00)
825.24
(1227.68)
4769.78
(4736.45)
1705.00
(1681.33)
2462.05 **
(1195.07)
3.85
(3.02)
1.22 *
(0.69)
−0.09
(1.47)
1.80 ***
(0.48)

Socioeconomic Characteristics
Aged 54 or younger
College degree
Land ownership
Years of ownership
Participating in government program
Participating in other commercial activities
An active outdoor enthusiast

−0.54 *
(0.33)
−0.07
(0.19)

Property Characteristics
Southeast parish
Hunting lodge/camp
Active management
One land type
Two land type
Total acreage of fresh water marsh
Total acreage of brackish marsh
Total acreage of salt marsh
Total acreage of other type of land

0.033
(0.19)
−0.19
(0.24)
0.99 **
(0.42)
0.19
(0.38)
0.03
(0.33)
0.0004
(0.0006)
0.0001
(0.0001)
−0.0001
(0.0004)
0.00003
(0.00009)

Notes: Delta-method standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05,
and * = 0.10.

With a positive and significant sign, the conditional marginal effect for hunting lodge/camp
indicated that landowners who had a hunting lodge/camp on his/her wetland parcel were found to
receive $3447 more income. The positive relationship between the presence of a hunting lodge/camp
and the level of income could be the fact that a hunting lodge/camp provides more comfortable ways
to enjoy the outdoor activities, which attract more visitors and therefore increased revenue.
Considering wetland types, the marginal effect results indicated that higher surface revenue
from fresh marshes than for brackish and saline marshes about surface revenues from alligator and
waterfowl. In particular, a one-acre increases in the freshwater marsh and brackish marsh translate
into an increase in income of $2.97 and $1.46 more income, respectively. The findings are consistent
with ecological research on the gradient estuarine productivity being generally lower for saline versus
fresher marshes [39].
The results from marginal effect estimation revealed that the longer the landowner owned the
wetland tract, the less income the landowner received from surface income-generating activities,
on average. It also appeared that the small portion of landowners (10%) who indicated that they
participated in government-sponsored wetland restoration programs were found to have less income
from surface activities, on average.
3.3. Participation in Wetland Programs
As previously stated, only 10% of respondents indicated that they had ever participated in a
state or federal wetland restoration program (Table 1). Those who had never participated were
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asked to respond to a range of potential obstacles to their involvement. Figure 2 depicts responses
to a three-point Likert scale of potential constraints to program involvement. Combining responses
identified as somewhat to very important, 60% of respondents indicated that their land was needed
for other purposes, 64% identified complications in the application, and 72% indicated concerns
over long-term commitment. The largest single obstacle, however, pertained to the lack of financial
compensation—with nearly 80% of respondents indicating that a lack of adequate funding to incentivize
their participation was a somewhat to very important constraint to participation. Additional obstacles
to
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Landowners were asked to indicate the importance of various policy instruments in regards
to their preference for wetland restoration in coastal Louisiana (Figure 3). Combining those policy
instruments identified as somewhat to very important, it is evident that respondents generally
supported most program options (>70%) such as public land acquisition, establishment of new markets
for coastal land, and permanent or temporary conservation easements. The most important options,
however, included: innovative tax incentive programs (80%), conservation cost-share agreements
(82%), and direct subsidies for plant, fish, and wildlife management (85%). (Direct subsidies for wildlife
and fisheries management may take the form of payments for control of invasive species or protection
of threated or endangered species habitat).
4. Conclusions
The private landowner engagement model for wetland conservation has not been widely utilized
in coastal regions of the United States, particularly in the LCZ. While a variety of state and federal
program options have been in place during the past two decades, participation in the coastal regions
has been relatively small compared to inland programming. The primary purpose of this study was to
understand why people participate in commercial activities on their land and future participation in
coastal restoration/maintenance programs might be improved. This survey focused on two primary
sources of surface income for the LCZ, alligator and waterfowl harvesting. Income generating decisions
were found to be driven by a number of factors, including expected net returns from engaging in these
activities, uncertainty as to the outcome of the engagement, and an array of socioeconomic/demographic
characteristics of the wetland owner and the physical characteristics of the property. The general
decision process of private landowners can be divided into a two-stage decision-making process.
Landowners initially decide whether to participate in income-generating activities and then consider
the level of income derived from these activities.
The Cragg’s DH model was applied to identify the determinants on the participation and level
of participation in income-generating activities using the household survey data. In general, the
study shows that the majority of the variables under investigation related to both the probability of
participation and the level of income. This implies that both landowners’ socioeconomic characteristics
and physical wetland characteristics are important to investigate the surface income from their coastal
wetland property and likelihood of participation. Our results, based on the estimated parameters
and marginal effects, revealed that decisions to participate in income-generating activities and the
level of income are related to physical characteristics of the property and socioeconomic/demographic
characteristics of the landowner. Descriptive statistics indicate that a lack of sufficient financial incentive
is the most important reason why landowners have not participated in state or federal programming
for wetland restoration and conservation. Nevertheless, respondents did indicate preferences for
specific forms of programming, indicating a wide degree of support for most options (>70%) with the
highest preferences (>80%) for programs that provided tax incentives, direct costs share agreements,
and subsidies for wildlife and fisheries management.
As mentioned earlier, 80 percent of coastal wetland is under private ownership in Louisiana,
the acceptance of private wetland owners to wetland-related programs and their participation in
these programs are critical if future coastal management efforts are to be successful. Encouraging
private investment, however, can be difficult because of the uncertainty as to the impact of any project,
the spatially complex nature of expected wetland losses, and the fact that the benefits of wetland
restoration tend to accrue to the general public rather than to individual landowners.
5. Discussion
5.1. Limitations and Further Research
The sample of data was drawn from five parishes (Cameron, Vermilion, Terrebonne Lafourche,
and Plaquemine parishes) among 20 coastal parishes in Louisiana. Although every effort was made
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to obtain all available data for econometric investigation in this study, the amount of data used for
descriptive and empirical statistical analysis is limited. As information from other parishes becomes
available, the analysis could be expanded and yield a larger database from which to conduct the
analysis. The empirical model of Cragg’s double-hurdle in which the first hurdle uses a Probit model
and a truncated normal model in the second hurdle was employed in this study. Since Cragg’s
double-hurdle model assumes independence for error distribution, there is an implication that the
results could be sensitive to model misspecification. Thus, it would be desirable to explore dependent
double-hurdle model and Box-Cox double-hurdle models for further research.
This study stratified landowners of 866 parcels into two groups based on the number of wetland
parcels they owned. An alternative, more comprehensive estimation of landowner participation in
income-generating activities would include all landowners. While the empirical analysis combined
both alligator harvest and/or waterfowl hunting enterprises, separate double-hurdle models could
be used to estimate participation effects for these and other surface revenue activities individually.
Moreover, the authors acknowledge the possibility of unobserved variables as drivers of participation
and surface income, however, these factors were not the focus of the study and are captured on the
error term.
5.2. Policy Implications
The results from this study suggest that only a few of Louisiana’s small-scale landowners choose
to participate in state or federal wetland restoration programs. Understanding the various attitudes
among landowners toward these programs provides the opportunity for policymakers to better
evaluate current and potential approaches to program implementation. Despite limited findings from
this research, the descriptive and empirical results have potential implications with respect to crafting
wetland restoration policy and data collection in coastal Louisiana.
First, policymakers may consider establishing additional outreach programs geared toward
the ‘smaller’ (i.e., non-corporation) coastal wetland owners. Unlike corporations with large coastal
tracts, the costs of remaining abreast of restoration programs and policy are likely large relative to
expected benefits for owners of smaller coastal parcels. Thus, any education program would need to
be developed with this understanding in mind and tailored accordingly.
Second, as recommended by Coreil [40], policymakers should consider ‘speeding up’ and
simplifying the application process and modifying restoration contract terms. Many of the concerns
listed in the comment section of the survey pertained to time constraints, both in terms of the long
time required for application processing and the long term of contracts. Policy adjustments in this
regard might prove useful.
Third, policymakers need to ascertain the types of incentives (financial and others) to entice
private landowners to accept wetland restoration projects on their property. Gaining the cooperation
of coastal landowners, however, is complicated by the fact that while the public benefits accruing
from these projects are likely to be large, private benefits are likely to be small and, potentially,
negative. If coastal restoration and management needs are to be met in Louisiana, public funds must be
leveraged to private investment. Therefore, financial incentives are likely to play an essential role in the
decision-making process among coastal landowners considering whether or not to engage in specific
types of wetland restoration and management activities. Moreover, results from this study indicate
that coastal landowners who participated in a state or federal restoration program receive less surface
income than landowners who did not participate. To the extent that these results are valid, an obvious
question arises regarding the opportunity costs of participation. In designing policy instruments that
might impede surface income activity (e.g., easements) policy-makers should consider the marginal
costs and benefits to landowners. Program participation would likely be higher for instruments
designed to compensate for losses in surface revenue. Compensation requirements, however, will
vary with differences in socioeconomic factors and individuals are likely to exhibit heterogeneous
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preferences over a range of relevant land use alternatives. Thus, policymakers need to consider a
portfolio of policy instruments to increase the range of options available for private coastal landowners.
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Appendix A Wetland Economic Survey
2015 Wetland Economic Survey
INTRODUCTION

Dear Landowner,
I am writing on behalf of LSU AgCenter and the Louisiana Sea Grant to request your help with an
important project. As part of a larger program, we are conducting a survey to understand why people
participate in commercial activities (alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting) on their land and how
we can improve future coastal restoration/maintenance programs in Coastal Louisiana.
The following questionnaire will take approximately 10 min to complete. The information you
provide us will be extremely valuable regarding potential policy instruments aimed at encouraging
private participation in coastal wetland maintenance and restoration.
Participation is strictly voluntary and you may refuse to participate at any time. WE ASSURE
YOU THAT YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. Moreover, the results of the
survey will be only reported in a summary format, so again no one will link you to your responses.
Please complete the attached questionnaire and return it in the self-addressed postage-paid envelope
to us within the next TWO WEEKS.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. If you have any questions or need help with this
survey, please feel free to contact us at:
Phone number: 225-578-6296
Email: walterk@lsu.edu or hwang23@lsu.edu
Note: If you prefer to complete this questionnaire online, please provide your email address
and parcel ID to Hua Wang at hwang23@lsu.edu and we will send the appropriate linkage to
the questionnaire.
Sincerely,
Walter R. Keithly, Jr.
Survey Project Leader
Louisiana Sea Grant
Louisiana State University

Hua Wang
Survey Project Assistant
Louisiana Sea Grant
Louisiana State University

Enclosed with this questionnaire is a wetland GIS map which according to parish records is
identified as a parcel you own in the coastal zone. Later in this questionnaire we are going to ask you
to focus on commercial activities associated with this parcel (alligator harvest or waterfowl hunting).
And all of your answers will be kept strictly confidential and never associated with your name.
Section 1: General Information
1.

Do you own the parcel on the map enclosed with this questionnaire?

Enclosed with this questionnaire is a wetland GIS map which according to parish records is
identified as a parcel you own in the coastal zone. Later in this questionnaire we are going to ask you
to focus on commercial activities associated with this parcel (alligator harvest or waterfowl hunting).
And all of your answers will be kept strictly confidential and never associated with your name.
Resources 2019,
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Section
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Do you own the parcel on the map enclosed with this questionnaire?
□ NO
□ YES

If No, please stop here, fold this booklet, place it in
the prepaid envelope and drop it in the mail to prevent
you receiving future mailings from us. We apologize

If Yes, please continue to fill out this survey

2.

2.

How do you own the specific parcel?

How □do
you
own the specific parcel?
Sole
ownership

□ Joint
ownership through an undivided heirship
 Sole
ownership
□ Joint
ownership
through
corporation heirship
or trust
 Joint
ownership
through
ana undivided
□
Other
(please
explain)
______________________________________
 Joint ownership through a corporation or trust
3.
If
you maintain
joint
ownership of the parcel, what is your ownership percentage?
 Other
(please
explain)
______________________________________

3.
4.

________ %

If you
ownership
of the
what is
your ownership percentage?
4. maintain
Based onjoint
the enclosed
GIS map,
is theparcel,
stated acreage
correct?
________
□ NO%
YESthe enclosed GIS map, is the stated acreage correct?
Based□on

If no, what is your estimated of the correct acreage?
________ acres
5.
Approximately how long has this parcel been in family possession?
________
years
If no, what
is your
estimated of the correct acreage?
6.
Referring
________ acres to the enclosed GIS map, what types of wetland do you own on this parcel? (Check the answer
to all that apply)
Approximately
how long has this parcel been in family possession?
□ Salt marsh
________
years
□ Brackish marsh
□ Freshwater
marsh
Referring
to the enclosed
GIS map, what types of wetland do you own on this parcel? (Check the
□ There is no wetland on this parcel
answer to all that apply)
7.
Do you use this property for any commercial-based activities?

 NO
 YES

5.
6.

 Salt marsh
 Brackish marsh
 Freshwater marsh
 There is no wetland on this parcel

7.

Do you use this property for any commercial-based activities?
 NO—If NO, please skip to question 14
 YES—If YES, please proceed to question 8

8.

Please indicate the commercial activity (activities) on this property? (Check the answer to all
that apply)
 Alligator harvest (including egg collection)
 Waterfowl hunting
 Other (please specify)_____________________________________

9.

What is the total number of acres of parcel you use for the following commercial activities? Please
outline the area on the GIS map enclosed and select the type of wetland (check all boxes that apply)
 Alligator harvest: ________ acres
( Salt marsh;  Brackish marsh;  Freshwater marsh  Other)
 Waterfowl hunting: ________ acres
( Salt marsh;  Brackish marsh;  Freshwater marsh  Other)
 Other: ________ acres
( Salt marsh;  Brackish marsh;  Freshwater marsh  Other)

10.

Is there any hunting lodge/camp on the parcel?
 NO
 YES

11.

Do you actively manage your property for waterfowl habitat (e.g., water control, vegetation
management through burning, cutting, herbicides . . . )?
 NO
 YES
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What was the revenue derived from the parcel in question from the following commercial
activities in 2015? (Again, this information will be confidential)
 $ ________ Alligator harvest (including egg collection)
 $ ________ Waterfowl hunting
 $ ________ Other

13.

Do you receive any sub-surface (oil & gas) revenue from this parcel?
 NO
 YES

14.

Do you participate in any state or federal wetland restoration programs?
 NO
 YES

14a. If YES, which program(s) do you participate in?
 Former Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) (Merged into Agricultural Conservation Easement Program in
2014 Farm Bill).
 Water Bank Program (WBP)
 Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA)
 Coastal Wetlands Planning, Preservation & Restoration Act (CWPPRA)
 Other (please specify) ________________________________

14b. If NO, why do you not participate? How important were the following reasons for doing so?
Check the appropriate box for each statement.
Reasons for not participation (check all
Not Important
that apply)
Too complicated to apply

Don’t want long-term contract

Not enough financial incentive

Need the land for other purposes

Other (explain):

________________________________________

Somewhat Important

Very Important















CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE

15.

How would you rate the following current or pending policy instruments in regards to wetland
restoration in coastal Louisiana? Please indicate (by checking a box) the level of importance for
each current or pending approach below.
Policy instruments
Public land purchases
Public purchase of permanent or temporary
conservation easements
Establishing new markets for land
Implementing innovative tax
incentive programs
Subsidies for plant, fish, and
wildlife management
Conservation cost sharing arrangements

Section 2: Demographics
16.

Which range includes your age?
 Under 25
 25–34
 35–44
 45–54
 55–64
 65 or older

Not Important


Somewhat Important


Very Important
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What is your gender?
 Male
 Female

18.

What is your race?
 White
 Asian
 Native American
 Black/African American
 Latino/Hispanic
 Other (please specify) _________

19.

Which of the following best describes your total household pre-tax 2015 income?
 Under $20,000
 $20,000–$39,999
 $40,000–$59,999
 $60,000–$79,999
 $80,000–$99,999
 $100,000–$150,000
 Over $150,000

20.

What is the highest level of education you have completed?
 Less than High School
 High School Degree or equivalent
 Some College
 College Degree
 Bachelor Degree
 Master Degree
 Doctorate

21.

Do you consider yourself an active outdoor enthusiast?
 NO
 YES

22.

If YES, what are your favorite outdoor activities?
___________________________
Do you consider yourself an environmentalist?
 NO
 YES

23.

If YES, how would you rate your effort in environmental protection? Please circle the
appropriate number
(1 with no effort . . . 5 with great effort).
1———-2———-3———-4———-5
Finally, we welcome your opinion on any topics that might not have been adequately covered
in this survey, please use the space below. Also, if you would like a copy of the final report,
please provide an email address and we will send you an electronic version of the report.

I want to thank you for your time and candid answers. You have been very helpful. Please return
the survey within the next TWO WEEKS in the self-addressed postage-paid envelope provided.
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